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INSURANCE LAW-HOMEOWNER'S LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES: WHEN
WILL THE PENNSYLVANIA COURTS INFER INTENT TO INJURE
Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Barthelemy
I. INTRODUCTION
When an individual sexually abuses a child, will the abuser's home-
owner's liability insurance cover the injury to the child? The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently addressed this issue when
an insured sexually molested his thirteen-year-old niece and then re-
quested that his insurance company pay for the child's injuries.' The
Third Circuit denied his request and held that the insured must pay for
the damage that he caused.2
Homeowner's liability policies generally provide coverage for "occur-
rences,"3 which are defined as accidents resulting in either bodily injury or
property damage.4 These policies, however, usually deny coverage for
highly probable or intentionally caused damages 5 in an intentional injury
exclusion clause. 6 There are two ways that an insurance policy can ex-
1. Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1993). For a
complete discussion of the facts in the Wiley case, see infra notes 109-12 and accom-
panying text.
2. Id. at 468 (holding that insurance company has neither duty to defend
against nor duty to cover claims arising from intentional sexual abuse of child).
For a complete discussion of the Wiley case, see infra notes 107-29 and accompany-
ing text.
3. 11 GEORGE J. COUCH & RONALD A. ANDERSON, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D
§ 44:285 (1982 & Supp. 1995) (defining "occurrence" under routine liability pol-
icy); see also 7AJOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrICE § 4501.02 (1979
& Supp. 1994) (discussing homeowner's liability policies); James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr.,
Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Ex-
pressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 A.L.R 4TH 957, 971 (1984
& Supp. 1995) (defining coverage on "occurrence basis" under typical contempo-
rary liability policy).
4. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4501.09 (defining "occurrence" as accident,
otherwise policy could be used as license to "wreak havoc at will"); COUCH & AN-
DERSON, supra note 3, § 44:285 (stating general wording of contemporary liability
policy).
5. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4501.09 (stating type of damage contemporary
liability policy does not cover).
6. Rigelhaupt, supra note 3, at 969-70 (stating courts' name for part of liability
policy excluding coverage for intentional acts).
(927)
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clude coverage in these instances:7 (1) through the actual definition of
"occurrence" in the policy8 or (2) through the use of an exclusion clause.9
This Casebrief will discuss possible meanings of intentional injury ex-
clusion clauses. Part II examines various interpretations of the intentional
injury exclusion clause' 0 and specifically investigates the Pennsylvania
courts' interpretation of these clauses.'" Part III explores the "inferred
intent" theory of intentional injury exclusion clauses, which is applied in
child molestation cases.1 2 Part III also analyzes Pennsylvania's adoption of
the "inferred intent" approach.' 3 Finally, Part IV of this Casebrief dis-
cusses the possible expansion of the "inferred intent" approach to areas
other than sexual abuse of children. 14
II. BACKGROUND
This section of this Casebrief explores the various interpretations of
intentional injury exclusion clauses.' 5 Part A presents the four main inter-
7. Id. Courts typically refer to a provision of a liability insurance policy as an
"intentional injury exclusion clause" in three different situations. Id. In the first
situation, the liability insurance policy defines "occurrence" in such a way that it
excludes any expected or intended damage, thus the exclusion is actually con-
tained within the definition of what is covered. Id. In the second type of policy,
the policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident which results in bodily injury or
property damage," and then also contains an exclusion clause for expected or in-
tended injury on the part of the insured. Id. at 970. The third type of policy is
where the court merely states that there is an "intentional injury exclusion clause"
but fails to point to any particular policy language. Id. In the third situation, there
may be no policy language, but the court may determine that there is an inten-
tional injury exclusion clause. Id.
8. Id. When an insurance company attempts to exclude coverage through
defining what it covers, then it defines "occurrence" as "an accident which results
in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." Id. (emphasis added).
9. Id. The second way in which an insurance company attempts to exclude
coverage is through an exclusion clause. Id. In this situation, the insurance com-
pany defines "occurrence" as "an accident which results in bodily injury or prop-
erty damage." Id; However, the policy also includes another clause which states
that there is no coverage for "injury or damage caused intentionally by or at the
direction of the insured;" this is an exclusion clause. Id.
10. For a complete background on courts' interpretation of intentional injury
exclusion clauses, see infra notes 19-49 and accompanying text.
11. For a complete discussion of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's inter-
pretation of intentional injury exclusion clauses in normal liability cases, see infra
notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
12. For a complete discussion of the background of the "inferred intent" ap-
proach to intentional injury exclusion clauses, see infra notes 70-106.
13. For a complete discussion of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's "in-
ferred intent" approach, see infra notes 107-44 and accompanying text.
14. For a complete discussion of other possible situations where courts will
infer intent, see infra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
15. For a complete discussion of interpretations of intentional injury exclu-
sion clauses, see infra notes 19-69 and accompanying text.
928
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pretations of these clauses. 16 Part B analyzes the approach which a major-
ity of jurisdictions have used to interpret intentional injury exclusion
clauses.17 Finally, Part C sets forth Pennsylvania's approach to these
clauses. 18
A. The Four Interpretations of Intentional Injury Exclusion Clauses
A typical insurance liability policy provides coverage for an insured's
accidents. 19 Almost all liability policies, however, contain an exclusion for
intentional or expected injuries,20 commonly referred to as an intentional
injury exclusion clause.2 1 Unfortunately, state courts do not agree on the
requirements for excluding coverage under these clauses.2 2 Courts use
16. For a complete discussion of the four main interpretations of intentional
injury exclusion clauses, see infra notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
17. For a complete discussion of the majority approach to these clauses, see
infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
18. For a complete discussion of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's ap-
proach to intentional injury exclusion clauses, see infra notes 50-69 and accompa-
nying text.
19. COUCH & ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 44.285. Generally, homeowner's lia-
bility policies cover "occurrences." Id. An " 'occurrence' means an accident, in-
cluding continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which result in bodily
injury or property damage." Id.; see also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSUR-
ANCE LAw: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMER-
CtAL PRACTICES § 5.4(d)(1) (student ed. 1988) (noting that basic definition of
coverage states: "the insurer will pay damages for which an insured ... becomes
legally responsible because of an accident") (footnote omitted); Rigelhaupt, supra
note 3, at 971 (noting that current liability policies provide coverage for "occur-
rences" which are defined as "accident[s] which result[ ] in bodily injury or prop-
erty damage").
20. Rigelhaupt, supra note 3, at 971. There are two ways that an insurance
policy can exclude coverage for highly probable or intentionally caused damage:
(1) within the actual definition of coverage or (2) through the use of an exclusion
clause. Id. at 969-70. The first way to exclude coverage involves a liability policy
where the policy defines "occurrence," for which there is coverage, in such a man-
ner that it excludes expected or intended damage; thus the exclusion of expected
or intended damage is within the actual definition of what is covered. Id. An
example of this would be "defining 'occurrence' in pertinent part as an accident
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured." Id. at 970. The second way for a home-
owner's liability policy to exclude coverage is when there is a separate clause deny-
ing coverage for expected or intended injury on the part of the insured. Id. at 970.
An example of this type of exclusion clause is a policy that defines an occurrence
as an event resulting in bodily injury or property damage, but later the policy con-
tains a clause excluding "liability 'for injury or damage cause intentionally by or at
the direction of the insured.' " Id.
21. Id. at 969 (noting that different courts have referred to such policy provi-
sions as "intentional injury exclusion clauses"). This Casebrief will refer to these
provisions as intentional injury exclusion clauses.
22. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.4(d) (2). Courts have held that liabil-
ity insurance does not cover an insured when the individual intended the injury.
Id. The courts, however, have reached different conclusions regarding whether
there is coverage when the insured asserts that although the action which caused
the injury was intended, neither the specific injury nor any injury was intended.
3
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several different approaches to determine whether coverage should be de-
nied under an intentional injury exclusion clause.23 These four ap-
proaches include: (1) the "some type of harm" approach,2 4 (2) the
"similar type of harm" approach,2 5 (3) the substantially certain ap-
proach 26 and (4) the tort approach.2 7
Id.; see United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(noting that courts have been unable to reach agreement as to interpretation of
"intended" within exclusion clauses), alloc. denied, 528 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1987); L. Stu-
art Griggs, Note, The Intentional Injury Exclusion: When Is There no Intent Behind the
Intention?, 11 AM. J. TRIA.. ADvoc., 527, 530-32 (1988) (noting that states have
interpreted exclusion clauses differently); Kristin Wilcox, Note, Intentional Injury
Exclusion Clauses - What is Insurance Intent?, 32 WAYNE L. REv. 1523, 1530-31
(1986) (stating that courts have differed in interpretation of exclusion clauses).
23. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.4(d)(2); see, e.g., Robert B. Carter,
Construction of "Expected or Intended Injury" Exclusions in North Carolina: N.C. Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Stox, 71 N.C. L. REv. 2101 (1993) (discussing
various judicial interpretations of definition of "intent" required for intentional
injury exclusion clauses); Constance M. Alvey, Note, Intentional Injuy Exclusion:
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pacchetti, 60 UMKC L. REV. 559, 561-62
(1992) (noting that there are three approaches to intentional injury exclusion
clauses: purely subjective intent approach, natural and probable consequences ap-
proach and subjective approach that sometimes infers intent as matter of law);
James E. Berger, Note, Liability Insurers GetA Fair Dea4 59 Mo. L. REv. 209, 209-10
(1994) (stating that there are three approaches to determining if insured intended
to injure); Asim K. Desai, From the Standpoint of the Insured: Insured's Loophole or
Insurer's Noose, 23 Sw. U. L. REv. 595, 604 (1994) (stating that there are three ap-
proaches to intentional injury exclusion clauses: subjective approach, objective ap-
proach and inferred intent approach); Wilcox, supra note 22, at 1523 (noting
different approaches to determining intent for intentional injury exclusion
clauses).
24. For a complete discussion of the "some type of harm approach" to inter-
preting intentional injury exclusion clauses, see infra notes 28-30 and accompany-
ing text.
25. For a complete discussion of the "similar type of harm approach" to inter-
pretation of intentional injury exclusion clauses, see infra notes 31-34 and accom-
panying text.
26. For a full discussion of the substantially certain approach to defining in-
tent for intentional injury exclusion clauses, see infra notes 35-36 and accompany-
ing text.
27. For a full discussion of the tort standard in interpreting the meaning of
intentional injury exclusion clauses, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
Several courts have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Continental W. Ins. Co. v.
Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1976) (holding that tort law is relevant to extent it
reflects intent); Argonaut Southwest Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.
1973) (applying tort doctrine of intent to intentional injury exclusion clauses); see
also Lawler Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Pacific Indem. Ins. Co., 383 So. 2d 156, 158
(Ala. 1980) (findingd that injury is "intended" or "expected" if insured consciously
acted and resultant injuries are natural and probable consequences of such ac-
tion); Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 647 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Kan. Ct. App.
1982) (holding that there is presumption that insured intended "natural and prob-
able consequences of his action); Hins v. Heer, 259 N.W.2d 38, 40 (N.D. 1977)
(noting that if act is intentional and results in injuries which are natural and prob-
able consequences of act, then injuries are intentional).
930 [Vol. 40: p. 927
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1. "Some Type of Harm" Approach
The "some type of harm" approach allows the insurance company to
deny coverage if the insured intended any harm at all, as long as the in-
sured intended some type of harm.2 8 This approach does not take into
consideration whether the harm which the insured intended is the actual
harm that resulted.2 9 A majority of states have adopted this approach,
allowing many insurance companies to. deny coverage under an inten-
tional injury exclusion clause if the insured intended some injury.30
2. "Similar Type of Harm" Approach
The "similar type of harm" approach is narrower than the "some type
of harm" approach, for it only allows the insurance company to deny cov-
erage if the harm that the insured's actions caused was the same type of
harm that the insured desired to occur.3 1 State courts apply two different
28. KEETON & WmIss, supra note 19, § 5.4(d) (2). One approach to interpret-
ing intentional injury exclusion clauses is to determine if there was "a purpose to
do 'some' harm." Id. This interpretation of intentional injury excludes coverage if
the insured "intended any type of harm to any person." Id.
29. Id. (noting that this approach disregards whether insured intended type
of harm that actually occurred).
30. See Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1979) (holding that exclusion is applicable if insured acts with intent to cause
some injury, even if actual injury that occurred differs from expected injury);
Steinmetz v. National Am. Ins. Co., 589 P.2d 911, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (noting
that intentional injury exclusion clause applies if insured intended bodily injury
regardless of whether resulting harm is more severe or different than intended
injury), modified, St. Paul Property & Liab. Co. v. Eymann, 802 P.2d 1043 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991) (limiting Steinmetz to instances where likelihood of injury was certain);
Lockhart v. Allstate Ins. Co., 579 P.2d 1120, 1122-23 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that intentional injury exclusion clause applies if insured intended injury regard-
less of whether or not insured intended specific resultant injuries); Clemmer v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098, 1110 (Cal. 1978) (noting that insured must in-
tend to inflict some injury, but court does not specify that need intent to cause
exact harm occurred); Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 934, 939 (Colo. Ct. App.
1976) (holding that insured must intend some harm for intentional injury exclu-
sion clause to apply); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Hart, 291 S.E.2d 410, 413 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1982) (noting that "exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent
or expectation that bodily injury occur, even if the actual, resulting injury is differ-
ent either in kind or magnitude"); Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions, 607 P.2d 422,
426 (Idaho 1980) (holding that for intentional injury exclusion clause to apply
insurer must prove insured acted with intent to cause some injury); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Minn. 1982) (holding that to be ex-
cluded from coverage, insured must have specifically intended to cause injury,
even if actual injury was different than intended injury); Hanover Ins. Co. v. New-
comer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (adopting "some type of in-
jury" approach); Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388, 392 (Neb. 1979) (noting that
specific subjective intent for exact injury that occurred is not necessary for cover-
age to be denied); Tal v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 1194, 1196-97 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div.) (noting that insured intended some injury, and thus inten-
tional injury exclusion clause applied), cert. denied, 425 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1980).
31. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.4(d)(2). A second approach limits
the intentional injury exclusion definition of "intention" to injuries of the same
1995]
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interpretations of this approach.3 2 The first interpretation is extremely
restrictive and requires the consequence of the action to be the specific
injury that the insured hoped to cause.3 3 The second interpretation of
this approach is broader and requires only a similar injury to result, rather
than the exact injury which the insured intended to occur.3 4
3. The Substantially Certain Approach
The substantially certain approach expands the concept of intent to
cause injury to include knowledge.3 5 The insurance company can deny
coverage through the exclusion clause if the insured knew with substantial
certainty that the harm would result from his or her actions.3 6
kind. Id. "[T]hat is, no limitation applies if the insured did not intend the type of
harm that resulted." Id.; see also United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), alloc. denied, 528 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1987); Miller v. Fidelity-Phoe-
nix Ins. Co., 231 S.E.2d 701, 702 (S.C. 1977); Griggs, supra note 22, at 537 (noting
that courts in Ohio, Pennsylvania and South Carolina adopt "same type of harm"
approach (citing Riverside Ins. Co. v. Wiland, 474 N.E.2d 371 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984))).
32. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.4(d) (2) (noting that coverage de-
pends on whether insured intended type of injury, maybe even specific injury).
33. Id. Some jurisdictions have required the action to result in the "specific
injury" that the insured hoped to bring about. Id.; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Sparks, 493 A.2d 1110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (requiring that insured intended
precise injury that occurred to prove intent). Under this approach, it is more diffi-
cult for insurance companies to deny coverage as opposed to when they can deny
coverage if the insured intended a similar type of harm. KEETON & WIDISS, supra
note 19, § 5.4(d)(2). The jurisdictions which have adopted this approach reason
that the insurance company should compensate the victim because the insurance
company has the deep pockets. Id.
Most jurisdictions, however, have rejected this argument. See, e.g., Butler, 548
P.2d at 939 (explicitly rejecting argument that insured must have specific intent to
cause type of injury actually suffered); Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240,
242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that exclusion applies if some harm was in-
tended, not necessarily specific harm desired); Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269
N.W.2d 885, 887 (Minn. 1978) (noting that required intent is not "intent to cause
the specific injury complained of"); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Muth, 207
N.W.2d 364, 366 (Neb. 1973) (refusing to adopt approach that insured must in-
tend injury that actually occurred in order for court to find intent); Oakes v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 349 A.2d 102, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (re-
jecting that insured must intend "specific injury" that actually occurred for cover-
age to be denied), cert. denied, 358 A.2d 189 (N.J. 1976).
34. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.4 (d) (2) (emphasis added).
35. Id. This approach states that if the insured was substantially certain that
the harm would occur, then the injury was expected or intended and there is no
coverage. Id. Under this approach, "knowledgeable intent," as well as "purposive
intent," will preclude coverage. Id.
36. Id.; see also Wilcox, supra note 22, at 1532. The courts have established a
two-prong test to determine subjective intent. Id. The first prong defines intent as
the insured's "actual, subjective desire." Id. Alternatively, the second prong also
allows the court to exclude coverage if the action was such that the harm was sub-
stantially certain to occur. Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 927
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4. The Tort Approach
Finally, the tort approach excludes coverage if a reasonable person
would consider the harm to be the natural and probable consequence of
his or her action.3 7 Unlike the first three approaches, this approach con-
stitutes an objective standard which disregards the insured's state of
mind.38 This approach focuses on the reasonable person and what that
person would have thought was likely to occur from the intended action.3 9
B. The Majority Approach: "Some Type of Harm"
The majority of states have determined that insurance companies may
deny coverage if the insured intended "some type of harm."40 The major-
ity approach is best described through its application in Butler v. Behaeghe4 t
and Iowa Kemper Insurance Co. v. Stone.42 In Butler, the Colorado Court of
Appeals held that a court must determine that the insured specifically in-
tended to cause some harm for coverage to be denied under an inten-
tional injury exclusion clause, even if the actual resulting harm differed
from the harm intended.43 The defendant in Butler caused permanent
37. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 4 (d) (2). Liability is excluded if the
injury is the natural and probable consequence of the insured's action. Id. This
approach determines what a reasonable person, not the insured, would expect to
be the consequences of his or her actions. Id.; see also Griggs, supra note 22, at 536
(stating that tort doctrine approach focuses on intended action, not on intent to
injure, and then, on natural and probable consequences of that action); Wilcox,
supra note 22, at 1530-31.
38. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.4 (d) (2) (noting that this approach
looks to viewpoint of reasonable person, not viewpoint of insured); see also Wilcox,
supra note 22, at 1534 (stating that minority of courts have adopted objective stan-
dard which focuses on natural and probable consequences of insured's action).
39. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.4 (d) (2). The insurance company
does not have to prove the subjective state of mind of the insured. Id. It need only
prove that a reasonable person would have expected the harm that actually oc-
curred to have resulted from the insured's action. Id.
40. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986), alloc. denied, 528 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1987).
The court in Elitzky analyzed the different interpretations of the word "in-
tended" in the intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. The court determined that
the majority approach was the "some kind of harm" approach: the insured in-
tended the harm that actually resulted if the insured intended some type of bodily
injury or damage. Id. (citing Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898 (Wis.
1979)).
41. For a complete discussion of Butler v. Behaeghe, 548 P.2d 934 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1976), see infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
42. For a complete discussion of Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone, 269 N.W.2d
885 (Minn. 1978), see infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
43. Butler, 548 P.2d at 938-39. The court stated that insurance companies
avoid coverage as a result of an intentional injury exclusion clause only if the in-
sured acted with the intent to cause some injury. Id. It did not matter that the
character or the gravity of the resulting injury was different from the intended
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eye damage to the plaintiff when he hit the plaintiff with a steel pipe.4 4
The court denied coverage because the defendant intended some type of
harm when he hit the plaintiff with a steel pipe.45 In Kemper, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota arrived at the same conclusion - that the insured
must specifically intend to cause some harm in homeowner's liability cases
in order for coverage to be denied.46 The defendant in Kemper hit the
plaintiff in the head with a belt which caused the plaintiff to develop a
permanent epileptic condition. 47 The court held that while the defend-
ant may not have intended such a severe injury, he undoubtedly intended
some injury, and thus there was intent to harm. 48 Both Butler and Kemper
represent cases where the "some type of harm" approach was used by state
courts.
4 9
C. Pennsylvania's Interpretation of Intentional Injury Exclusion Clauses
While the majority of courts have adopted the "some kind of harm"
approach,5 0 Pennsylvania has not.51 In United Services Automobile Ass'n v.
44. Id. at 936. In Butler, the plaintiff and the defendant became involved in a
quarrel over their children. Id. at 936. The defendant told the plaintiff to get off
his property, but the plaintiff refused. Id. Then, the defendant struck the plaintiff
in the head with a steel pipe causing permanent eye impairment. Id. At the time
of this occurrence, the defendant was insured under a liability policy issued by
Safeco Insurance Company of America (Safeco). Id. at 935. Safeco denied cover-
age, because the defendant's policy contained an intentional injury exclusion
clause. Id. at 935-37.
45. For a complete discussion of the holding in Butler, see supra notes 43-45
and accompanying text.
46. Kemper, 269 N.W.2d at 887. The court determined that the meaning of
the intentional injury exclusion clause was well settled. Id. An intent to act was not
enough; the insured must also have intended some injury, even if the actual injury
was of a different magnitude or nature than the injury originally intended. Id.
47. Id. at 886. The defendant, a 16-year-old boy, was out with several of his
friends when they encountered the plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff and defendant had
fought several times before, and now decided to resolve their differences once and
for all. Id. Defendant struck the plaintiff on the temple with his belt. Id. The
injuries the plaintiff suffered from the blow caused the development of an epilep-
tic condition. Id. At the time of the fight, the defendant was covered under his
father's homeowner's liability policy which contained an intentional injury exclu-
sion clause. Id.
48. Id. at 887. The court compared this case to Pendergraft v. Commercial
Standard Fire & Marine Co., 342 F.2d 427 (10th Cir. 1965). Kemper, 269 N.W.2d at
887. In both cases, the defendants hit the plaintiff in the head and a more severe
injury resulted than what the defendants had anticipated or intended. Id. at 886-
87. In Pendergraft, the insured was denied coverage because the insured intended
some type of injury. Id. at 887. The Kemper court adopted the same rule: coverage
is denied if the insured intended to cause bodily injury. Id.
49. For a complete discussion of the Butler and Kemper cases, see supra notes
40-49 and accompanying text.
50. See United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (acknowledging that majority of courts have adopted "some kind of harm"
approach), alloc. denied, 528 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1987).
51. Id. at 989.
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Elitzky,52 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that an intentional in-jury exclusion clause was applicable only if: (1) the insured intended to
cause injury of the same general type as that which resulted or (2) the
insured knew that such injury was substantially certain to occur. 53 The
court's standard combined the "similar type of harm" approach 54 and the
substantially certain approach. 55
In Elitzky, Judge Joseph C. Bruno had brought an action against the
Elitzkys for malicious defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
injury.5 6 The Elitzkys turned the action over to their homeowner's insur-
ance company.57 Their policy contained an intentional injury exclusion
clause under which the insurance company denied coverage. 58 The trial
52. 517 A.2d 982, 986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), alloc. denied, 528 A.2d 957 (Pa.
1987).
53. Id. at 989. The court held that an intentional injury exclusion clause ex-
cludes coverage only if the insured intended a similar type of injury to occur. Id.The court next described intent as knowing with substantial certainty that the con-
sequence will occur. Id.
54. For a complete discussion of the "similar type of harm" approach, see
supra notes 31-34 and the accompanying text.
55. For a full discussion of the substantially certain approach, see supra notes
35-36 and accompanying text.
56. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 984. From September 9, 1980 until October 4, 1983,the Honorable Joseph C. Bruno, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadel-phia County, presided over several cases in which Judy Elitzky was a litigant. Id. Inhis complaint, Judge Bruno alleged that during this time period, the Elitzkys wroteletters to him, another judge, the District Attorney of Philadelphia and the Attor-
ney General of Pennsylvania. Id. These letters stated that Judge Bruno: was in-
volved in a "behind the scenes arrangement to circumvent discovery," was believedby "federal officials" to be "a participant in the coverup of the criminal activity oftrustees," was guilty of "judicial corruption," attempted to "fix" a case, and had an
"improper relationship" with a party to a case and with the law firm of Wolf, Block,Schorr and Solis-Cohen. Id. Judge Bruno denied. these allegations and sought
compensatory damages for these alleged defamatory statements. Id. He alleged
that the Elitzkys either knew that these statements were false or were reckless infailing to determine the truthfulness or falsity of the statements. Id. In the secondpart of his complaint, Judge Bruno also alleged that the defendants published
these statements for the sole purpose of inflicting emotional distress on him. Id.In the third part of his complaint, Judge Bruno sought to recover punitive dam-
ages for the alleged "malicious, intentional and reckless conduct of [the] defend-
ants." Id.
57. Id. In November of 1979, the Elitzkys bought a homeowner's insurancepolicy from United Services Automobile Association (United). Id. This policy wasin force at the time of the suit. Id. The defendants turned to United to defend
and indemnify them. Id. at 984-85.
58. Id. at 984-85. The policy in question covered: " 'damages because of bod-ily injury and property damages.'" Id. However, coverage was "subject to the fol-lowing exclusionary clause: '1.) Coverage E - Personal Liability and Coverage F
- Medical Payments to others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage.
a.) Which is expected or intended by the insured.' " Id. United disclaimed cover-
age. Id. at 985. In March of 1984, United brought a declaratory action alleging
that it had neither the duty to defend nor indemnify the Elitzkys in the actionbrought byJudge Bruno. Id. The court stated that while judge Bruno's causes of
action were definitely "bodily injury" or "property damage," because these claims
9
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court agreed that the insurance company had neither the duty to defend
nor the duty to cover the claims arising from the damages. 59 The defend-
ants subsequently appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in determin-
ing that the insurance company had no duty to defend their claims. 60
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that the duty to defend
and indemnify is determined by whether the injuries alleged are covered
by the policy.61 To ascertain whether the insureds have coverage, the
court noted that it must interpret the language of the insurance policy,62
specifically the words "intended" and "expected" in the exclusion clause. 63
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that other state courts
have disagreed in their interpretation of the exclusion clause. 64 The court
were based on intentional tort theories, they were excluded from coverage under
the policy's coverage exclusion. Id. The exclusion clause mandated denial of cov-
erage because the damage or injury was intended or expected. Id.
59. Id. "[T] he court entered a decree that United [the insurance company]
need not provide coverage .... [Then] the court concluded that United had no
duty to defend the Elitzkys." Id.
60. Id. The trial court held that United did not have a duty to defend, but
refused to determine whether United had a duty to indemnify. Id. The trial court
reasoned that the issue of indemnification was not yet ripe, because Judge Bruno
had not proven his action. Id. The Elitzkys presented three issues for the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania to review: (1) whether the trial court erred when it decided
United had no duty to defend the Elitzkys; (2) whether the trial court erred when
it failed to determine that United had a duty to indemnify the Elitzkys if Judge
Bruno was successful in proving his action; and (3) whethier the trial court erred
when it granted United's motion in limine. Id.
61. Id. The obligation to defend is based solely on the allegations in the un-
derlying action. Id. (citing Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 152 A.2d
484 (Pa. 1959); Vale Chem. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 490 A.2d 896
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 516 A.2d 684 (Pa. 1986)). If the com-
plaint alleges an injury that may be within the policy's coverage, the company is
obligated to defend until the company can prove that the claims are not covered.
Id. (citing Vale, 490 A.2d at 900).
62. Id. To determine whether alleged injuries are covered, the court must
determine exactly what is covered. Id. In Erie Insurance Exchange v. Transamer-
ica Insurance Co., 507 A.2d 389, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
533 A.2d 1363 (Pa. 1987), the court summarized the four theories for interpreting
insurance coverage: (1) words should be given their plain meaning; (2) ambigu-
ous terms should be construed against the insurer (3) "a term 'will be held ambig-
uous only if reasonably intelligent men on considering it in the context of the
entire policy would honestly differ as to its meaning' "; and (4) the intent of the
instrument must be determined by considering the entire document. Elitzky, 517
A.2d at 986.
63. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 986 ("Resolution ... hinges on interpretation of the
words 'intended' and 'expected' as used in the Elitzkys' insurance contract.").
64. Id. The courts have been unable to reach one definite interpretation of
the intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. While some courts declare that the
clause is unambiguous, other courts have stated that the clause has more than one
meaning. Id. Compare Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Thrift-Mart, Inc., 285 S.E.2d 566,
572 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that exclusion clauses are clear) with Cowan v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 318 N.E.2d 315, 323 (111. App. Ct. 1974) (holding that exclusion
clauses are ambiguous).
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania remarked that the clause has been inter-
[Vol. 40: p. 927
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found that for the intentional injury exclusion clause to apply under Penn-
sylvania law, the insured must have intended to cause the "resultant
harm," merely intending the act is insufficient.65 The court stated that
"resultant harm" meant the harm that occurred must be the same general
type of harm which was intended, thus adopting the "similar type of harm"
approach. 66 The court then noted that intent also existed if the insured
intended to cause the consequences of his act or acted knowing that such
consequences were substantially certain to result, thus also adopting the
substantially certain approach.
67
preted in at least four different ways: the "some kind of harm" approach, the tort
approach, the "specific injury that resulted" approach or the "similar type of harm"
approach. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 986-87. For a complete discussion of the "some type
of harm" approach to interpretation of intentional injury exclusion clauses, see
supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of the tort
approach to interpretation of intentional injury exclusion clauses, see supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of the "specific injury
that resulted" approach to interpretation of intentional injury exclusion clauses,
see supra note 33 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of the "simi-
lar type of harm" approach to interpretation of intentional injury exclusion
clauses, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
65. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987. While exclusion clauses can be interpreted in
several different ways, Pennsylvania courts have interpreted them to require the
insured's intent to cause the same general type of harm that occurred. Id.; see also
Eisenman v. Homberger, 264 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1970) (holding that in this situation
there was no evidence that insured intended any kind of damages and insured
must intend to produce damage similar to that which did occur).
66. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987-88. The Elitzky court adopted the "similar type of
harm" approach after analyzing the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania approach in
Eisenman. Id. at 987.
While stealing liquor from the plaintiffs, the defendants in Eisenman lit several
matches to see around the house. Eisenman, 264 A.2d at 673. One of the matches
caused a fire which destroyed the entire house. Id. at 674. The court in Eisenman
stated that the issue was whether the defendants had intended the resulting prop-
erty damage. Id. The court held that the insurer must prove that the insured
intended not only the act, but also the damage that occurred. Id. The court then
determined that there was no basis for determining that the defendants had in-
tended any property damage when dropping the matches. Id.
In Eisenman, the court determined that the defendants did not intend to cause
any property damage; thus, it implied that if the defendants had intended some
kind of property damage, there would have been intentional damage or injury.
Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 987 (citing Eisenman v. Hornberger, 264 A.2d 673 (Pa. 1970)).
Further, the Eisenman court noted that by the act of stealing the liquor, the defend-
ants did intend the harm of stealing the liquor. Id. at 987-88. As a result of the
Eisenman decision, the court in Elitzky determined that Pennsylvania follows the
"similar kind of harm" approach; the insured must intend the "same general type
[of harm] as that which [the insured] set out to inflict." Id. at 988. For a complete
discussion of the "similar type of harm" approach, see supra notes 31-34 and ac-
companying text.
67. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 988-89. The court referred to its decision in Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hassinger, 473 A.2d 171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), stat-
ing that an insured intended injury if he knew with substantial certainty that the
consequences were likely to result or he wanted to bring about the resultant harm.
Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 989. The court's determination of the intentional injury clause
combines two approaches: the "similar type of harm" approach and the substan-
11
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In applying this interpretation of the exclusion clause to the home-
owner's liability policy in Elitzky, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
that the exclusion clause only excluded damages of the same kind that
were intended or were substantially certain to occur, not injuries that were
the result of reckless acts. 68 Because the injury to the judge could have
been the result of reckless acts by the defendants, the court held that the
complaint stated a cause of action that was within coverage. 69
tially certain approach. Id. For a detailed discussion of these two approaches, see
supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
68. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 989.
69. Id. The Honorable Joseph C. Bruno had alleged libel for which he could
recover even if the Elitzkys were merely reckless, not intentional, in their disregard
of the truth of their statements. Id. at 989-91. The court discussed the term "reck-
less," as defined by the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, and determined that recklessness
would be within coverage of the Elitzky's policy. Id. at 989-90.
The court, in applying the facts to determined law, held that United was re-
quired to defend the action, because the action could possibly be within coverage.
Id. The court continued its analysis of the intentional injury exclusion clause to
determine whether the word "expected" affected the meaning of the intentional
injury exclusion clause. Id. at 991. The court held that the terms "expected" and
"intentional" were synonymous, and thus "expected" did not affect the meaning of
the intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. Insurance companies across the nation
added the word "expected" to the intentional injury exclusion clause in order to
exclude coverage for certain foreseeable results. Id. at 990.
Since the addition of the word "expected" to such policies, four different
meanings of the word "expected" have evolved in the courts. Id. One approach
holds that the terms "expected" and "intended" are indistinguishable and do not
add or detract from each other. Id.; see also Grange Mut. Casualty Co. v. Thomas,
301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that there is no difference in
meaning of intentional injury exclusion clause when term "expected" is added);
Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing
to adopt interpretation of "expected" which would add element of foreseeability to
"intended");Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Neb. 1979) (referring to Min-
nesota case which held in relation to policy language that "there is no substantial
distinction . . . between . . . 'expected or intended' and those injuries 'caused
intentionally' "); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 101, 104 (Vt. 1979) (finding
'expected" to "practically equate with 'intended' "); Poston v. United States Fidel-
ity & Guar. Co., 320 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that while it has not
been conclusively established that "intended" and "expected" are "absolutely sy-
nonymous," this state appears to have adopted Wisconsin's approach under which
there is " 'no substantial distinction in meaning' " between terms). The second
approach states that the injury is expected if the actor knew or should have known
that there was a substantial probability that the injury would occur. Elitzky, 517
A.2d at 990; see City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052,
1058-59 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that "expected" in intentional injury exclusion
clauses requires showing that "insured knew or should have known "that there was
a substantial probability that certain consequences will result"). The third ap-
proach suggests that the term "expected" excludes coverage if the harm was more
likely than not. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 990; see C. Raymond Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins., 467 F. Supp. 17, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (defining "expected" in inten-
tional injury exclusion clauses to mean "more likely than not" to occur). The final
definition of "expected" merely suggests that the term "expected" adds an element
of conscious awareness. Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 990-91; see Bay State Ins. Co. v. Wilson,
451 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ill. 1983) (stating that "expected" means reasonably antici-
pated and conscious awareness). For a complete discussion concerning the addi-
[Vol. 40: p. 927
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III. THEORY OF "INFERRED INTENT"
A. Background on the Development of the "Inferred Intent" Approach
Regardless of the approach courts take in determining the meaning
of intent in intentional injury exclusion clauses, the majority of courts in-
fer intent to harm when the act giving rise to the insurance claim is child
sexual molestation. 70 The "inferred intent" approach states that intent to
cause injury or harm to the child will be inferred regardless of whether or
not the insured says that he or she actually intended to harm the child.71
1. Origin of "Inferred Intent"
The "inferred intent" approach initially developed in Minnesota state
courts. 7 2 The Supreme Court of Minnesota introduced the theory of "in-
ferred intent" in Caspersen v. Webber,73 when the defendant, a restaurant
customer, shoved the hatcheck girl into the door of the hatcheck room.74
The court analyzed the defendant's insurance liability policy7 5 which con-
tained an exclusion for intentionally caused injury.76 The court held that,
tion of the word "expected" to insurance policies, KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 19,
§ 4(c) (2) (ii).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Elitzky agreed that there was an element
of conscious awareness in "expected," but that this was already reflected within the
term "intentional." Elitzky, 517 A.2d at 991. Therefore, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania adopted the first approach, that "expected" and "intentional" are sy-
nonymous. Id. at 989-91.
70. Carolyn L. Mueller, Comment, Ohio Homeowners Beware: Your Homeowner's
Insurance Premium May be Subsidizing Child Sexual Abuse, 20 U. DAYrON L. REV. 341,
351 (1994). Mueller noted that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted the "in-
ferred intent" approach in child sexual molestation cases; many adopting it even
though they normally require a showing of actual intent in other types of liability
cases. Id. at 351-52.
71. Alvey, supra note 23, at 562 (stating that courts may infer intent given
nature of act). For a complete discussion of "inferred intent," see infra notes 72-
106 and accompanying text.
72. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815, 819-20 (D. Alaska 1987) (not-
ing that group of courts following Minnesota courts have held that in sexual as-
sault cases injury is to be inferred as matter of law).
73. Caspersen v. Webber, 213 N.W.2d 327, 330 (Minn. 1973) (developing the-
ory of "inferred intent" for intentional injury exclusion clause).
74. Id. at 328. Janet Caspersen was employed as a hatcheck girl at the Park
Terrace Cafe where Richard Webber and his wife ate dinner. Id. After dinner
Richard Webber went to reclaim his coat, but he was unable to find his claim
ticket. Id. He asked to be allowed in the room, but Caspersen, the hatcheck at-
tendant, refused. Id. He brushed her aside and entered the room, but failed to
locate his coat. Id. He left the room, checked his pockets for his ticket, but was
still unable to locate the ticket. Id. He again tried to enter the room and while in
the process of entering the room, Webber shoved Caspersen into a metal rack. Id.
Janet Caspersen sued Richard Weber for personal injuries. Id.
75. Id. at 329-30. Defendant was insured under a policy, issued by Indiana
Lubermens Mutual Insurance Company, which stated that the policy covered dam-
ages as the result of bodily injury. Id.
76. Id. This policy did not cover bodily injury that was caused intentionally by
or at the direction of the insured. Id. at 330.
19951 CASEBRIEF 939
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in accordance with the policy, the insured must have the intent to cause
bodily injury.77 However, the court then stated that the intentional injury
exclusion clause might still apply if the "nature or character of the act"
suggested that intent should be inferred as a matter of law. 78 The court
rejected the defendant's argument that assault and battery were acts for
which the court should infer intent.79 While the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota did not specify what actions would justify "inferred intent," the
court did establish that there could be some actions for which a court
could infer intent.80
In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Hill,8 1 the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota finally defined an act, child molestation, where the courts will infer
intent as a matter of law.8 2 The defendant in Hill sexually assaulted a
child and then claimed protection under his homeowner's insurance pol-
icy.83 The defendant's policy provided coverage for bodily injury and
property damage, but specifically excluded coverage for injury "expected"
or "intended."8 4 The court, referring to Caspersen, said that harm is "ex-
77. Id. The court said that unless the resulting injury is intended, the exclu-
sion clause is inapplicable. Id.
78. Id. The court referred to a statement in the American Law Reports which
says: it is the harm itself that must be intended before the exclusion will apply.
There is, however, some authority for the proposition that such a clause will oper-
ate to relieve a liability insurer of its duty to indemnify ... where the nature or
character of the act is such that an intent to cause harm is thereby inferred as a
matter of law. Id. (quoting W.E. Merritt III, Annotation, Liability Insurance: Specific
Exclusion of Liability for Injury Intentionally Caused by Insured, 2 A.L.R. 3d 1238, 1241
(1965)).
79. Id. at 330. If the intent was inferred, the insurance company would not
have been liable under the policy. Id. The jury determined, as a finding of fact,
that Webber did not intend to harm Janet Caspersen. Id. The court held that
there was coverage under the liability policy. Id.
80. Id. (stating that nature of some actions might be such that intent could be
inferred, but not giving examples of such acts).
81. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982). In Hill,
Fireman's Fund Insurance Company brought a declaratory judgment action to de-
termine whether charges for child molestation by the insured, Hill, were within
policy coverage. Id. The court held that the defendant's act of sexual molestation
was excluded from coverage under the intentional injury exclusion clause of his
liability policy. Id. at 835.
82. Id. at 835 (stating that "nature of Hill's conduct was such that an intention
to inflict injury can be inferred").
83. Id. at 834-35. The defendant, James Hill, and his wife were foster parents
for approximately 10 children from 1973 to 1983. Id. Prior to 1976, a former
foster child's parent alleged thatJames Hill had sexually molested his child while
the child was in Hill's care. Id. The Welfare Department had placed another fos-
ter child, a young boy, with the Hills, and James Hill molested this boy also. Id.
The State filed criminal actions against James Hill, and the boy and his parents
subsequently filed an assault proceeding againstJames Hill. Id. at 835. At the time
of the assault, James Hill owned a homeowner's liability policy issued by Fireman's
Fund Insurance Company. Id. at 834-35.
84. Id. at 835. The terms of the policy established that Fireman had to pay for
any damages that resulted from an "occurrence." Id. The policy then defined
"occurrence" as an "accident which results in bodily injury or property damage."
940 [Vol. 40: p. 927
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pected" or "intended" if the nature or character of the act is such that
intent to inflict injury can be inferred as a matter of law. 85 Thus, even
though the defendant claimed that he did not intend to harm the child,8 6
the Supreme Court of Minnesota inferred intent to inflict injury from the
nature of the crime: sexual assault of a minor.8 7
2. Rationale for Inferring Intent in Child Molestation Cases
A majority of state courts have adopted the "inferred intent" rule in
child sexual molestation cases, and thus, most insurance companies have
neither a duty to defend nor a duty to indemnify in such cases.88 While
Id. Finally, the policy contained an exclusion for" 'bodily injury or property dam-
age which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.' " Id.
85. Id. The Supreme Court of Minnesota stated that for the insurer to be able
to exclude coverage under the exclusion clause, the insured must have intended
injury of the same general kind. Id. The court then stated that it was insufficient
for the insured to intend the act in order to come within the exclusion, that "[t]o
be excluded from coverage, a person must have specifically intended to cause in-
jury, although intent to injure will be found even if the actual injury is different in
kind or more severe than that intended." Id.; see Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Stone,
269 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 1978) (holding that intentional injury exclusion clause
excluded coverage for actions if insured intended some kind of harm). However,
the court also referred to Caspersen's "inferred intent" theory. Hill, 314 N.W.2d at
835; see Woids v. North Star Mut. Ins. Co., 306 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 1981) (intent
can be inferred as matter of law). For a further discussion of Caspersen, see supra
notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
86. Hill 314 N.W.2d at 835. James Hill stated that he was socially and emo-
tionally immature and had not intended to harm the boy. Id.
87. Id. The court held that "the nature of Hill's conduct was such that an
intent to inflict injury can be inferred as a matter of law." Id. The facts show that
Hill knew that the Welfare Department would disapprove of his actions and view
them as detrimental to the child. Id. The court stated that "[t]hese facts give rise
to an inference of intent." Id.
88. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581, 584-85 & n.7 (W. Va.
1988) (stating that "majority of jurisdictions deciding these questions hold that
there is neither a duty to defend nor to pay" for sexual misconduct of insured).
In Leeber, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted the "in-
ferred intent" theory for intentional injury exclusions. Id. at 587. In Leeber, a West
Virginia student sued his teacher for sexually abusing him. Id. at 582-83. Leeber,
the teacher, facilitated an "abnormal" relationship with a student, Brian, by becom-
ing more like a "friend" or "surrogate parent." Id. He also made sexual advances
and sexually abused Brian. Id. After criminal proceedings were finished, Brian's
parents filed suit for "intentional, willful, wanton, and negligent acts... in sexual
contacts with Brian and in seducing and enticing him." Id. The defendant at-
tempted to turn the lawsuit over to his insurance company, the Horace Mann In-
surance Company, but the policy contained an intentional injury exclusion clause.
Id. at 583. Thus, the Horace Mann Insurance Company filed a declaratory judg-
ment action claiming that it had no duty to defend or provide coverage because of
the exclusion. Id.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia then had to determine
whether an insured who had sexual contact with a child is covered under his liabil-
ity insurance when the policy contains an intentional injury exclusion clause. Id.
at 584. The Leeber court noted that a split in jurisdictions had developed regarding
this issue. Id. The court determined that the majority ofjurisdictions have denied
the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify as a result of the inferred intent rule.
1995]
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most states usually apply a subjective standard to interpret intentional in-
jury exclusion clauses, the same states apply an objective test to interpret
these same clauses in child sexual molestation cases.89 This objective stan-
dard allows courts to infer intent to injure as a matter of law in cases where
the insured engaged in some type of sexual misconduct.9 0
State courts use an "inferred intent" approach to interpret intentional
injury exclusion clauses for several reasons.9 1 Some courts infer intent to
injure in sexual misconduct cases because the nature of the act is inher-
ently injurious.9 2 A majority of the courts, however, infer intent to injure
Id. at 584-85; seeJ.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 699 (Cal.)
(noting that most states deny coverage in such cases), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902
(1991).
89. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d at 584-85. The court in Leeber noted a trend in the ma-
jority ofjurisdictions to apply an objective test in evaluating the meaning of inten-
tional exclusion clauses in sexual misconduct cases. Id.; see American States Ins.
Co. v. Borbor, 826 F.2d 888, 895 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying California law stating
that "an insurer may not contract to indemnify an insured against the civil conse-
quences of the insured's wilful criminal acts"); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Huie, 666 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that defendant's actions
were such that construed in terms of liability there was intent to injure), aff'd,
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bomke, 849 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1988); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (noting that sexual
abuse of child is of such nature that intention to inflict injury can be inferred);
CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ark. 1984) (finding intent to
injure even though defendant stated that he did not intend to injure); McCul-
lough v. Central Fla. YMCA, 523 So. 2d 1208, 1208-09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that "[riegardless of the molester's subjective speculation, expectation, or
intent to cause or not to cause bodily injury to a molested child, an intentional act
of child molestation of a criminal character is not an accident"); Altena v. United
Fire & Casualty Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Iowa 1988) (stating that district court
was correct to infer intent to injure victim as a result of insured engaging in sexual
acts with victim); Harpy v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 545 A.2d 718, 722 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (holding that defining having sex with child who was 13 years
old and younger at time of occurrences as " 'anything but intentional injury is
ridiculous' "); Estate of Lehmann v. Metzger, 355 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. 1984)
(noting that intent will be inferred in sexual misconduct cases); Vermont Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Malcolm, 517 A.2d 800, 802 (N.H. 1986) (noting that when determining
meaning of "accidental," insured's act is not accidental if insured intended to
cause resultant injury or act is "so inherently injurious that it cannot be performed
without causing the resulting injury"), modified, Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Scanlon, 638 A.2d 1246 (N.H. 1994); Rodriguez by Brennan v. Williams, 729 P.2d
627, 630 (Wash. 1986) (noting that "intent to injure, while normally a subjective
determination . . . should be inferred in sex abuse cases").
90. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d at 585 (noting that intent will be inferred in sexual mis-
conduct cases).
91. Id. at 584-87 (noting that different courts have applied the inferred intent
rule in interpreting intentional injury exclusion clauses for different reasons).
92. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d 365, 370 (N.Y. 1992) (holding
that harm was inherent). The defendant in Mugavero committed acts of sodomy
and sexual abuse on a six-year-old girl and a nine-year-old boy while his wife was
baby sitting them. Id. at 366-67. When the defendant and his wife were sued, they
attempted to turn the defense and liability for their damages over to their home-
owner's liability insurance company, but Allstate brought a declaratory judgment
action claiming that there was no coverage. Id. at 367. The policy in dispute con-
942
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because of state prohibitions of sexual conduct between adults and mi-
nors.93 By criminalizing the conduct, states warn insureds that there is an
understanding that such actions can only result in harm.9 4 Courts also
note that it is not within an insured's "reasonable expectations" that the
insured will be covered for sexual molestation of children when the in-
sured purchases an insurance policy.95 Finally, some courts adhere to the
tained an exclusion for injury intentionally caused by the insured. Id. The com-
plaint by the children's parents alleged that the defendant acted with intent or, in
the alternative, that the resultant harm was caused by negligence. Id. at 368-69.
The defendant claimed that because the complaint alleged either that the resul-
tant harm was unintentional or that the resultant harm was caused by negligence,
that even if the act was intended, the insurance company was obligated to defend.
Id. The court held that the insurance company was not obligated to defend the
defendant or pay for the damages he caused, Id. The court first remarked that
merely because the act is intended does not mean that the harm that results is
intended. Id. at 369. But, Allstate pointed out, and the court accepted, that in the
exceptional cases of child sexual molestation, "cause and effect cannot be sepa-
rated." Id. The court noted that it has been accepted by society that harm is inher-
ent in the act of sexually molesting a child. Id. The harm is inseparable from the
act. Id. The court noted that the legislature has also stated that this act is inher-
ently harmful by declaring it a felony to have sexual intercourse or commit sodomy
with a child under the age of 11, regardless of whether the resulting injuries were
intended. Id.; see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Smith, 907 F.2d 900, 902 (9th
Cir. 1990) (stating that sexual contact between adult and child is inherently injuri-
ous); M.K., 804 P.2d at 695 (holding in regards to child molestation "[t]he act is
the harm"); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989) (stating
that it "defies logic" to state that child molester "intends anything but harm").
93. Mueller, supra note 70, at 353. The fact that states have overwhelmingly
prohibited sexual interaction between minors and adults has led a majority ofjuris-
dictions to conclude that such contact can be inferred to be harmful to the child.
Id.
94. Id. A majority of jurisdictions have held that making such contact crimi-
nal means not only that the action is inherently harmful, but also that society as a
whole has determined that intent to act is intent to harm in the molestation of a
child. Id.; see, e.g., Smith, 907 F.2d at 902 (stating that one who violates Nevada
Revised Statute § 201.230 by engaging in lewd acts with children under age of 14
cannot claim he or she intended act of molestation without also intending harm);
M.K., 804 P.2d at 698 (agreeing that child molestation in violation of Penal Code
constitutes wilful act within Insurance Code); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789
P.2d 415, 419 (Colo. 1990) (noting that criminal statue makes implicit resulting
harm from child molestation).
95. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d at 586-87. The idea that coverage for sexual abuse of
minors is not within an insured's "reasonable expectations" stems from the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations. Id. The doctrine of reasonable expectations, a
method of interpreting insurance policies, states that the reasonable expectations
of the insured and the insured's beneficiaries will be honored, even if, upon review
of the actual policy, the language of the policy would have negated these expecta-
tions. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495-96 (W.
Va. 1987).
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in Leeber, stated that an in-
sured cannot reasonably expect the insurance company to defend and pay for the
sexual misconduct of the insured, regardless of the language of the intentional
injury exclusion clause. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581, 587; see Rodriguez by Brennan v.
Williams, 713 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wash. Ct. App.) (noting that average homeowner
purchasing liability insurance would be appalled at idea that he or she was
17
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theory that child molestation is a criminal act, and it is against public pol-
icy to allow insurance to cover criminal or intentional acts. 9 6
3. Rationale Against Inferring Intent in Child Molestation Cases
Rather than applying the theory of "inferred intent," a small minority
of states require a showing of actual intent to cause harm, a subjective
standard of intent, even in sexual molestation of children cases. 97 These
courts adopted this subjective standard because it provides another source
of recovery for the victims: the insurance company.98 Courts following
the majority approach, however, criticize this minority approach for two
reasons. First, the minority approach is impossible to prove because an
individual will rarely admit that he or she intended harm. Thus by forcing
purchasing coverage for damages or injuries resulting from his or her sexual abuse
of child and that no insured would want to share that risk with any other home-
owner), aff'd en banc, 729 P.2d 627 (Wash. 1986). See generally Roger C. Hender-
son, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990) (analyzing origin and development of doctrine of reason-
able expectations over last 20 years); Paula L. Harrington, Note, The Duty to Defend
in California After Montrose Chemical Corporation v. Superior Court: Is the Califor-
nia Supreme Court Protecting Policyholders or Encouraging Litigation and the Early Settle-
ment of Unworthy Claims, 31 CAL. W. L. REv. 165, 181 (1994) (stating that if
insurance contract is ambiguous, then contract must be interpreted to reflect in-
sured's reasonable expectations); Scott B. Krider, The Reconstruction of Insurance
Contracts Under the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 155
(1984) (developing doctrine of reasonable expectations and explaining its impact
on insurance contracts).
96. Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 230 (W. Va. 1981). In Hensley, the
defendant, highly intoxicated, drove his vehicle on the wrong side of the road and
collided head-on with the plaintiffs. Id. at 228. The defendant's liability insurance
contained an exclusion for damage or injury that the defendant intentionally
caused. Id. In trying to determine whether public policy precluded an insurance
company from covering punitive damages, the court noted that the majority of
jurisdictions have determined that it is against public policy to allow insurance
coverage for an intentional tort. Id. at 228-29.
97. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d at 586. A small number of courts apply a "strictly subjec-
tive" test, even in sexual misconduct cases. Id.; see, e.g., State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
McIntyre, 652 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (requiring subjective intent to harm
before insurance coverage denied); Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608 609-10 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (same); MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166 (N.H.
1984) (declining to "inject concepts of substantive tort law" and noting that in-
sured must intend injury). Subjective intent refers to actual intent to cause the
specific injury suffered. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d at 586. However, since the Leeber deci-
sion, states who were predicted by federal courts to adopt the subjective approach
have changed to the majority view. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Davis, 612
So. 2d 458 (Ala. 1993) (rejecting inferred intent); Shearer v. Central Florida
YMCA, 546 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 1989) (disapproving majority opinion of in-
ferred intent).
98. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d at 586. By requiring a subjective standard, the insur-
ance company is not relieved of responsibility to defend and cover under the in-
tentional injury exclusion clause until they have proven actual intent to harm. Id.
Thus, the justification for the minority's approach is that it provides another
source of compensation for the victim, the insurance company who cannot prove
actual intent to harm. Id.
[Vol. 40: p. 927
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someone to prove the subjective intent of the insured, courts make it im-
possible to establish the insured's guilt.99 Second, several jurisdictions
simply repeat that it is against public policy to allow an individual to insure
himself or herself against one's own intended acts of harm. 10 0
4. Further Refinement of the "Inferred Intent" Approach
In 1988, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals refined "inferred intent" by,
developing a standard to determine when it was appropriate to infer in-
tent.10 1 In KA.G. ly Carson v. Stanford,102 the court interpreted an inten-
tional injury exclusion clause in a child sexual molestation case to exclude
coverage for the insured.' 0 3 The court held that when faced with an in-
tentional injury exclusion clause, it will infer intent to injure only if: (1)
the insured acts intentionally and (2) the injury is substantially certain to
occur. 104 The court concluded that sexual molestation is an intentional
99. Id. Critics of the minority approach have focused their arguments on its
impracticality. Id. To require a completely subjective test would almost always
make the insurance company liable under an intentional injury exclusion clause,
unless the insured admitted that he intended to harm the victim. Id. " 'Human
nature augers against any viable expectation of such admissions.'" Id. (quoting
Truck Ins. Exch. v. Pickering, 642 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)); see West-
ern Nat'l Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 719 P.2d 954, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (re-
marking on "logically untenable" approach of subjective intent to cause specific
injury).
100. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d at 586. Although the minority's approach would pro-
vide the victim with a deeper pocket from which to recover, the court remarked
that courts could "spread the risk" of any intentional tort by applying the inferred
intent approach to other torts. Id. However, this court and the majority of other
courts have concluded that public policy is against people benefitting from their
wrongdoing, and thus it would be against public policy to "spread the risk" of the
intentional torts. Id. For a further discussion of this public policy rationale, see
supra note 96 and accompanying text.
101. K.A.G. by Carson v. Stanford, 434 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)
(setting forth two-part test to determine when "inferred intent" is correct ap-
proach), review denied, 439 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 1989).
102. 434 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 439 N.W.2d 142
(Wis. 1989).
103. Id. at 793-94. The defendant owned and operated a mobile home park
where the plaintiff and her parents resided. Id. at 791. The plaintiff, a six-year-old
girl, frequently visited the defendant and his wife. Id. The defendant sexually mo-
lested the plaintiff, perhaps more than once. Id. The plaintiff and her parents
filed suit for the injuries that resulted from the conduct. Id. At the time of the
molestation, the defendant first held a policy issued by Heritage Mutual Insurance
Company, and then a policy issued by General Casualty Company. Id. at n.I. Both
policies contained an intentional injury exclusion clause which excluded liability
for injury or damage that resulted from expected or intentional injury. Id. at 792.
After devising a two-part test, the court came to the conclusion that sexual abuse of
a child is so likely to result in injury that intent will be inferred. Id. at 793-94.
104. Id. at 792. The two requirements are: (1) the action of the insured must
be intentional and (2) the conduct must be substantially certain to result in injury.
Id. The court further cautioned that this narrow rule was only to be applied if the
degree of certainty that the conduct would result in injury is so great that itjustifies
inferring intent to injure as a matter of law. Id.
19
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act from which injury is substantially certain to result, and thus intent may
be inferred. 10 5 Stanford defined a test for when it is appropriate to infer
intent for states which adopt the "inferred intent" approach.1 0 6
B. Pennsylvania's Adoption of the "Inferred Intent" Approach
In Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,10 7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit predicted that Pennsylvania would adopt the
"inferred intent" approach to intentional injury exclusion clauses when
the insured sexually molests a child. 10 8 In Wiley, the defendant sexually
molested his niece. 10 9 The defendant attempted to tender the suit over to
his insurance company, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State
Farm). 11° The plaintiffs and the defendant agreed to the filing of a de-
claratory judgment action against State Farm to determine State Farm's
responsibility under the policy.' 1 ' The defendant's policy contained an
exclusion for "intended" or "expected" injures.' 12 Because the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had not yet addressed the specific issue of whether
an insured had coverage for child molestation under the insured's home-
owner's liability insurance policy which contained an intentional injury ex-
105. Id. at 792-93. While the court did not define all of the actions that would
fall within this rule, they did determine that sexual molestation of a minor fits
within the rule. Id. at 793. The court stated that the more likely the harm is to
result from the action, the more likely intent to harm will be inferred. Id. The
court gave the example of firing a gun into a crowded room and stated that in
such a situation intent may be inferred. Id.
106. For a more complete discussion of the Stanford approach, see supra notes
.101-05 and accompanying text.
107. Wiley v. Sate Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1993) (pre-
dicting Pennsylvania law pertaining to standard of intent).
108. For a detailed discussion of the majority rule of "inferred intent" in child
molestation cases, see supra notes 70-106 and accompanying text.
109. Id. at 458-59. Floyd sexually molested his 13-year-old niece in the sum-
mer of 1986. Id. at 459. He was criminally prosecuted and pleaded guilty to inde-
cent assault and corrupting the morals of a minor. Id. at 458. Dennis and Elanie
Wiley, the girl's parents, then filed suit to recover for their daughter's personal
injuries. Id.
110. Id. Floyd turned the action over to State Farm Fire and Casualty Com-
pany (State Farm), because he had previously obtained a homeowner's liability
policy from them. Id. at 458. Although State Farm began to defend Floyd, they
reserved the right to deny coverage based on the meaning on the intentional in-
jury exclusion clause in Floyd's policy. Id. at 458-59.
111. Id. Eventually, Floyd and his niece's parents filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against State Farm to determine if State Farm had the duty to defend
and cover Floyd. Id. at 459.
112. Id. at 458 n.1. The policy provided coverage for damages for bodily in-
jury or property damage, but specifically excluded coverage for "bodily injury or
property damage which is expected or intended by an insured." Id. The court also
noted that the meaning of this exact clause was the "sole issue" of the lawsuit. Id.
at 458.
[Vol. 40: p. 927
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clusion clause, the Third Circuit had to predict how Pennsylvania courts
would interpret the policy and the exclusion. 113
First, the Third Circuit examined Pennsylvania law on intentional in-
jury exclusion clauses generally. 114 The Third Circuit noted that in Elitzky,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania applied a subjective standard of intent
to the intentional injury exclusion clause, thus excluding coverage only if
the injuries that occurred were of "the same general type which the in-
sured intended to cause." 11 5 The court then noted that while this is a
common standard in normal liability insurance cases, it is the extreme mi-
nority approach in sexual molestation of minors liability cases.1 1 6
Next, the court looked to district court interpretations of Penn-
sylvania law.1 17 The Third Circuit indicated that the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania previously predicted the
adoption of the "inferred intent" theory by Pennsylvania for homeowner's
liability cases involving the sexual molestation of a child in Foremost Insur-
ance Co. v. Weetman.118 The Third Circuit was convinced by the district
113. Id. at 459. A federal court which has diversity jurisdiction must deter-
mine substantive state law and then apply it. Id. (citing Robertson v. Allied Signal,
Inc. 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir. 1990)). The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had not addressed the exact issue that was raised in this
case. Id. The issue was which approach to "intent" was to be applied in interpret-
ing intentional injury exclusion clauses of liability policies when the insured inten-
tionally sexually molested a child. Id. The Third Circuit remarked that there were
four items that it could consider in predicting how a Pennsylvania court would
resolve this issue: (1) Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decisions in similar areas;
(2) Pennsylvania intermediate courts' decisions; (3) federal appellate and district
court determinations of Pennsylvania state law; and (4) other jurisdictions' deci-
sions on the same issue. Id. at 459-60 (citing Gruber v. Owens-Illinois Inc., 899
F.2d 1366, 1369-70 (3d Cir. 1990)).
114. Id. at 460. The Third Circuit, after a brief introduction as to what the
"inferred intent" rule was, turned to Pennsylvania law regarding liability insurance
and intentional injury exclusion clauses. Id. For a more complete discussion of
inferred intent, see supra notes 70-106 and accompanying text.
115. Id. For a complete discussion of the Elitzky case, see supra notes 50-69
and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of the "similar type of harm"
approach to interpretation of the intentional injury exclusion clause, see supra 31-
34 and accompanying text.
116. Id. at 461. The Third Circuit noted that the subjective standard in the
interpretation of the intentional injury exclusion clause is "not uncommon." Id.
(citing Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 124-25 (Minn. 1976)).
The district court in this case, however, observed that in intentional sexual moles-
tation cases, a subjective standard of intent is a minority approach. Id. For a full
discussion of the minority approach to cases involving the sexual molestation of
children - homeowner's liability cases, see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying
text.
117. Wiley, 995 F.2d at 460. The third of four factors for determining Penn-
sylvania state law is to look at district court interpretations of state law. Id. For a
listing of all four factors, see supra note 113.
118. Id. at 461 (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Weetman, 726 F. Supp. 618, 621-22
(W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 694 (3rd Cir. 1990)). In the fall of 1985,J. Robert
Weetman sexually abused two young boys. Weetman, 726 F. Supp. at 619. The par-
ents of the boys filed suit against Weetman. Id. At the time of the occurrence,
1995]
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court's rationale that: (1) a majority of state courts adopted "inferred in-
tent" and (2) many courts which originally adopted the minority approach
had since switched to the "inferred intent" approach.' 19
The Wiley court outlined three possible approaches to determine if
the insured intended to cause harm: (1) whether there was intent to
cause some type of injury;' 20 (2) whether a reasonable person would have
expected or intended injury to occur; 121 and (3) whether intent could be
inferred from the act. 122 The Third Circuit then discussed when the "in-
Weetman had two homeowner's liability policies: one for his mobile home where
the incidents of abuse actually occurred and one for his permanent residence. Id.
Both policies contained intentional injury exclusion clauses which denied cover-
age for injuries that were "expected or intended." Id. Both insurance companies,
Foremost Insurance Company and Donegal Insurance Company, alleged that
child molestation as a matter of law is conduct where harm is "expected or in-
tended," and thus neither insurance policy covered the children's injuries. Id.
The children's parents, however, argued that there was an issue of fact as to
whether Weetman intended to harm their children. Id.
The district court noted that in the general interpretation of intentional in-jury exclusion clauses, Pennsylvania has held that the insured must intend the
same kind of harm that resulted in order for the intentional injury exclusion
clause to apply. Id. at 620 (citing United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 517 A.2d 982,
989 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), alloc. denied, 528 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1987)). The district
court later commented that a majority ofjurisdictions that have had liability cases
involving the sexual abuse of a child have "inferred intent." Weetman, 726 F. Supp.
at 620. Further, even in the jurisdictions where the minority approach of subjec-
tive intent was adopted, there has been a shift to the majority approach of "in-
ferred intent." Id. at 621 (citing to State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of
Jenner, 874 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1989) which rejected State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Estate ofJenner, 856 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1988) which rejected "inferred intent");
Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Malcolm, 517 A.2d 800 (N.H. 1986) (rejecting MacKin-
non v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166 (N.J. 1984) (holding that insured's subjec-
tive intent was relevant in case of sexual molestation of child)).
Finally, the district court did not adopt the minority approach merely because
it would provide a deeper pocket from which to compensate the victim. Weetman,
726 F. Supp. at 622. Instead, the district court held that sexual molestation of
children is inherently injurious, and thus harm should be inferred as a matter of
law. Id.
119. Wiley, 995 F.2d at 460-61. The Third Circuit noted that even more juris-
dictions have switched to the "inferred intent" rule since the decision in Weetman.
Id. n.6 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1990) (reversing
subjective intent in child molestation cases and adopting "inferred intent"); Landis
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1989) (adopting "inferred intent" in child
molestation cases in attempt to settle district courts' dispute); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Mugavero 589 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 1992) (reversing decision to use subjective intent
and adopting "inferred intent"), revg 561 N.Y.S.2d 35(A.D.2d 1990).
120. For a complete discussion of the "some type of injury" approach to deter-
mining whether the insured intended to cause the injury, see supra notes 28-30
and accompanying text.
121. For a complete discussion of the objective or reasonable person ap-
proach to determining if the insured intended to cause injury, see supra notes 37-
39 and accompanying text.
.122. Wiley, 995 F.2d at 462. The Third Circuit referred to the Minnesota ap-
proach of analyzing the nature or character of the act in inferring intent as a mat-
ter of law. Id. (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815, 819-20 (D. Alaska
948 [Vol. 40: p. 927
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ferred intent" approach would be appropriate, relying heavily on KA.G. by
Carson v. Stanford.123 The Stanford court and other courts adopting this
view held that the "inferred intent" approach is only applicable if the ac-
tion was intentional and the injury was substantially certain to occur. 124
Reflecting on other courts' explanations for embracing the "inferred
intent" approach, the Third Circuit examined the theory that harm is in-
herent in the sexual molestation of children, and thus intent should be
inferred.1 2 5 The Third Circuit then noted that the states which adopted
the "inferred intent" approach are usually states which prohibit sexual
contact between adults and children. Through these prohibitions, state
legislatures gave the public notice that such contact would injure chil-
dren.1 26 The Third Circuit also acknowledged that an average person
buying a homeowner's liability policy would not expect coverage for sex-
ual molestation of minors.12 7 Finally the court recognized that the minor-
ity approach is illogical.1 28 Th6 Third Circuit, in a very narrow holding,
declared that Pennsylvania would adopt the "inferred intent" rule in liabil-
ity insurance cases when the insured intentionally sexually molested a
child.12 9
The Third Circuit next faced the issue of how expansive Penn-
sylvania's "inferred intent" approach should be, especially in relation to
sexual misconduct between two adults.13 0 In Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v.
1987) (discussing "Minnesota approach")). For a complete discussion of the Min-
nesota approach, see supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
123. Wiley, 995 F.2d at 464-65. For a complete discussion of the Stanford case,
see supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
124. Wiley, 995 F.2d at 462 (referring to K.A.G. by Carson v. Stanford, 434
N.W.2d 790, 792 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) which noted that many courts have adopted
Stanford approach).
125. Wiley, 995 F.2d at 462-63. The Third Circuit recognized that the situa-
tion in Mugavero was almost identical to the issue that it was determining. Id. In
Mugavero, the court concluded that the harm could not be separated from the act
of sexual abuse, for it was inherent. Id. For a complete discussion of the analysis
of Mugavero, see supra note 92 and accompanying text. The California courts have
also declared that "[t]he act is the harm." Id. (quotingJ.C. Penney Casualty Ins.
Co. v. M.X., 804 P.2d 689 (Cal.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991)).
126. Id. at 464. For a complete discussion of the rationale that state proscrip-
tion of sexual relations of minors with adults allows the courts to infer intent to
injure, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
127. Id. For a complete discussion of the doctrine of reasonable expectations
and the connection to "inferred intent," see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
128. Id. For a complete discussion of the minority approach and its faults, see
supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
129. Id. The Third Circuit declared that the sexual assault of a child is an act
of such nature or character where harm is inherent. Id. at 464-65. Then, the court
held that in liability insurance cases where the insured sexually molests a child, the
court may infer intent to injure by the insured. Id.
130. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 191 (3d Cir. 1994).
The court determined that the issue in Barthelemy was "whether, under the facts
presented, this is a general liability insurance case in which the court must con-
sider the insured's subjective intent to harm, or whether it is another 'exceptional'
23
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Barthelemy, the Third Circuit addressed a situation where a female college
student sued nother college student for battery, negligent or reckless
conduct, and reckless infliction of emotional distress resulting from sexual
relations between the two.131 The defendant's insurance company argued
that Pennsylvania would expand its "inferred intent" approach to include
sexual misconduct between adults.13 2 If the court inferred intent to injure
in this sexual misconduct case, then the insurance company would not
have to defend the insured or pay for any damages he caused, because the
intentional injury exclusion clause would exclude such conduct. The
Third Circuit, in Barthelemy, rejected this argument and held that the dis-
trict court "erred in applying the 'inferred intent' rule" in this case.' 3 3
The Third Circuit began its analysis by remarking that Wiley applied
the "inferred intent" approach to "exceptional" cases of child sexual
abuse. 13 4 Wiley set forth a narrow rule stating that the "inferred intent"
standard applied only when the act was intentional and the degree of cer-
tainty of injury was sufficiently significant to justify inferring intent.13 5
case in which the court may infer the insured's intent to harm as a matter of law."
Id. at 192.
131. Id. at 190. Ms. McSparran, at the time of this incident, was a 19-year-old
student at Penn State University. Id. She was an inexperienced drinker and a
virgin. Id. Mr. Barthelemy, also a student at Penn State University, was a disc
jockey for the campus radio station. Id. He was 18 years old at the time of the
incident. Id. Ms. McSparran won a compact disc from Barthelemy's radio show,
and he promised her another disc if she stayed until the end of the show and
helped him take his music back to his dorm. Id. Once back in his room, they each
had two rum and cokes, and then Barthelemy told McSparran that she could have
another disc if she did four shots of rum. Id. He then convinced her that rum was
no different than beer and would not affect her at all. Id. McSparran did the four
shots, became ill and drunk, at which time Barthelemy had sexual intercourse with
her. Id.
Ms. McSparran filed suit against Barthelemy alleging that he was guilty of bat-
tery, negligent or reckless conduct, and reckless infliction of emotional distress as
a result of their sexual relations. Id. Barthelemy stated that the sexual intercourse
was a consensual act, and Ms. McSparran, except for the claim of battery, did not
state that Barthelemy used force or violence. Id. At the time of this incident,
Barthelemy was covered under his parents' homeowner's liability policy which con-
tained an intentional exclusion clause stating: the policy coverage did "not apply
to bodily injury or property damage ... which [was] expected or intended." Id. at
191.
132. Id. at 190. Aetna Life and Casualty argued that as a result of Wiley, Penn-
sylvania would adopt an expansion of intent in this case also. Id.
133. Id. at 194 (holding that district court erred in expanding "inferred in-
tent" rule to Barthelemy case).
134. Id. at 191. Barthelemy stated that Elitzky established that the approach to
intentional injury exclusion clauses was that the insured must intend to cause
harm, a subjective approach. Id. at 191-92. When the case concerns the sexual
abuse of a child, however, the court does not require subjective intent, but allows
the court to infer intent from the nature of the act. Id. (noting Wiley v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457, 460 (3d Cir. 1993)).
135. For a complete discussion of the narrow rule established in Wiley and its
application of Stanford, see supra notes 107-29 and accompanying text.
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The court in Wiley repeatedly cautioned that in cases other than sexual
abuse of a child Pennsylvania adopted the subjective intent standard.' 3 6
The Third Circuit compared Barthelemy and Wiley and found that
these two cases were more dissimilar than similar; thus, the Third Circuit
refused to extend the "inferred intent" approach to Barthelemy.t37 Fur-
thermore, the Third Circuit stated that the district court drew improper
conclusions when analogizing Barthelemy to Wiley.138 First, the district
court declared that because sexual assault was a crime, like the sexual mo-
lestation of a child, the "inferred intent" approach should be extended
because no reasonable person expected coverage under one's home-
owner's liability insurance for criminal activity.13 9 The Third Circuit re-
jected this analogy, for two reasons: (1) there was no crime in the
Barthelemy case and (2) Wiley focused on the inherently injurious act of
sexual molestation, not on crimes in general. 140 Second, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that the rationale for the Wiley decision was the widespread
acceptance of the harm which sexual activity caused for a child, regardless
of the adult's subjective intent, noting specifically the "tender age" of the
136. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d at 192. For a complete discussion of Pennsylvania's
general approach to intentional injury exclusion clauses, see supra notes 50-69 and
accompanying text.
137. Id. at 193. The Third Circuit noted that in applying the reasoning be-
hind Wiley, the dissimilarities between Wiley and Barthelemy were numerous, while
the similarities were few. Id. The Third Circuit compared and contrasted the two
cases on the basis that analogies are an important aspect of legal argument. Id.
The court set forth indicia that could be used to determine if the cases were alike
or not. Id. The first criteria was the number of cases that have been analyzed, the
more cases the more reliable. Id. Second, the cases must be analyzed in terms of
positive resemblances and negative resemblances. Id. And finally, the relevance of
the positive resemblances must be determined. Id.
138. Id. at 192.
139. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Barthelemy, 836 F. Supp. 231, 236 (M.D. Pa.
1993). The district court noted that sexual assault, whether of an adult or of a
child, was a crime. Id. at 237. Further, the court explained that a reasonable per-
son does not expect to obtain coverage for criminal activities when he or she
purchases a homeowner's liability policy. Id. For a complete discussion of the
reasonable expectation approach, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
140. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d at 192. The Third Circuit determined that the district
court expanded the "inferred intent" approach too far. Id. First, there was no
crime in Barthelemy. The plaintiff alleged battery and negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress which are both torts, not crimes. Id. The district court inappropri-
ately analogized this situation to rape, but there was no claim of rape. Id. (citing
Barthelemy, 836 F. Supp. at 232). Secondly, the Third Circuit in Wiley focused solely
on a particular crime, sexual molestation of children, not crime in general. Id. In
fact, Wiley recognized that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania had already deter-
mined that subjective intent was the appropriate standard when the defendant had
pled guilty to a crime. Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457, 466-
67 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen's Club, 618 A.2d 945 (Pa.
1992), alloc. denied, 637 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1993)). Therefore, it is inappropriate to
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victim at the time of the incident. 14 ' In Barthelemy, both individuals were
over eighteen, and consequently there was no "tender age" concern. 142
The Third Circuit held that the dissimilarities between Wiley and
Barthelemy significantly outweighed any similarities between the two cases
and held that Pennsylvania would not extend the "inferred intent" ap-
proach to Barthelemy.143 As a result, the Third Circuit held that the insur-
ance company failed to prove that the intentional injury exclusion clause
applied, for it did not prove the insured's subjective state of mind. 144
IV. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit predicted that Pennsylvania will adopt the "in-
ferred intent" approach to interpreting intentional injury exclusion
clauses in child sexual molestation cases. 145 Most states implementing "in-
ferred intent" pointed to the inherently injurious nature of the act as the
hallmark for applying the "inferred intent" standard. 146 The Third Cir-
cuit stated when it applied "inferred intent" in Wiley that "harm to chil-
dren in child molestation cases is inherent in the very act of sexual assault
committed on a child, regardless of the motivation for or nature of such
assault, and that the resulting injuries are, as a matter of law, inten-
tional."'147 The question remains, however, what actions, if any, besides
the sexual molestation of children, fit within this rule.148 Crimes such as
rape or firing a gun into a crowd appear to be inherently injurious inten-
tional acts that are substantially certain to cause injury. 149
141. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d at 193. Wiley adopted the "inferred intent" approach
to child molestation liability cases because of a recognition of society's determina-
tion that a child will be harmed regardless of the intent of the insured. Id. (citing
to Wiley, 995 F.2d at 464). Many jurisdictions which have adopted the "inferred
intent" approach in this situation have focused on the sexual abuse of a child, one
who is unable to consent because of young age. Id.
142. Id. For a complete discussion of the facts of Barthelemy, see supra notes
131-32 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 193. In summarizing the difference between the two cases, the
Third Circuit first remarked that Barthelemy was not a child molestation case which
is the exception for which Wiley predicted the use of "inferred intent." Id. Second,
unlike Wiley, a crime was not alleged, only a tort action. Id. Finally, there was no
involvement of children who need special protection. Id. Therefore, the Third
Circuit held that Pennsylvania would apply the rule of general liability in this case.
Id.
144. Id. at 194.
145. For a complete discussion of Pennsylvania's "inferred intent" approach,
see supra notes 107-44 and accompanying text.
146. For a complete discussion of the inherently injurious nature of sexual
molestation of children as a rationale for inferring intent, see supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
147. Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457, 464 (3d Cir. 1993).
148. For a complete discussion of California's expansion of "inferred intent"
to actions other than the sexual molestation of children, see infra notes 150-53.
149. For a more complete description of the Stanford approach to "inferred
intent", see infra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
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Currently, however only California openly extends the "inferred in-
tent" approach to situations other than sexual abuse of children. 150 Cali-
fornia applies the "inferred intent" approach to such acts as wrongfully
150. Desai, supra note 23, at 605. California courts began their analysis with
the theory that all liability policies have an implied intentional injury exclusion
clause. CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993); see Gary L. Fontana & Anthony J. Bar-
ron, Insurance Coverage for Intentional Acts, in COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILIT
POLICIES 1993, at 1 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
A4-4415, 1993) (stating that § 533 of California Insurance Code is equivalent of
intentional injury exclusion clause and part of every liability policy in California).
Section 533 of the California Insurance Code states: "[a] n insurer is not liable for
a loss caused by the willful act of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the
negligence of the insured, or the insured's agents or others." CAL. INS. CODE § 533
(West 1993). The California courts have interpreted this section of the California
Insurance Code as an implied intentional injury exclusion clause in all insurance
liability policies. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 694 (Cal.
1991) (citing United States Fiduciary & Guar. Co. v. American Employer's Ins. Co.,
205 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1984), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991); Clemmer v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991)).
The Supreme Court of California then held that child molestation is inher-
ently injurious, and the insured should not be covered for that intentional act
because intent will be inferred. M.K, 804 P.2d at 689. In M.K., the court held that
the insured who sexually molested a child was not covered under his homeowner's
liability insurance policy, regardless of whether or not he subjectively intended to
harm the child. Id. at 700. The insured often baby-sat for M.K., until M.L told her
mother that the insured sexually molested her. Id. at 690. The insured was
charged and pled guilty to committing lewd acts with a child. Id. He was sen-
tenced to prison for six years. Id.
At the time that the insured sexually molested M.K., he owned a homeowner's
liability policy issued by J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Company (J.C. Penney).
Id. This policy contained an intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. at 690-91. J.C.
Penney also referred to California's Insurance Code § 533 which provided that the
"insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful act of the insured." Id. At the
time of the criminal trial, J.C. Penney represented the insured, but reserved the
right to deny coverage under the intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. at 691.
J.C. Penney brought a declaratory judgment action in May of 1987. Id. The
insured testified that while he intended to do the act and knew that the act was
wrong, he did not intend to harm the child. Id. M.K. argued that an intentional
act is not excluded from coverage unless there is also an intent to inflict harm. Id.
at 693. The court held that there is no coverage as a matter of law. Id.
The court determined that § 533 of the California Insurance Code is an im-
plied intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. at 694. The court then noted that
"[t]he very essence of child molestation is the gratification of sexual desire. The
act is harm." Id. at 695. The court rejected the argument of M.K.'s expert psychia-
trist who told the court that the child molester is attempting to show affection to
the child, not harm him or her. Id. at 700. The court held that it was irrelevant
that the insured did not actually intend to cause the child harm; liability coverage
for insured's sexual molestation of a child was excluded. Id.
Next, the California state courts expanded the concept of inherent harm to
other actions. For a detailed discussion of California's expanded approach to "in-
ferred intent," see infra notes 151-53.
27
Houk: Insurance Law - Homeowner's Liability Insurance Policies: When Wi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
hitting a victim,' 5 1 sexual harassment' 52 and wrongful termination of an
151. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Atieri, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360 (Ct. App. 1991). In Altieri,
the California Court of Appeals for the Sixth District held that the subjective intent
of the insured to injure was irrelevant to the determination of the meaning of the
intentional injury exclusion clause when the defendant intentionally and wrong-
fully hit the victim. Id. at 361. The defendant accepted an offer for a ride home
from school from two fellow students. Id. at 362. While stopped at a stoplight, the
defendant and his classmates began a verbal disagreement with another student,
Story. Id. The light changed, and the boys continued on their journey, but the
defendant, still angry, asked the driver to turn the car around so that he could beat
up Story. Id. The defendant and one of his classmates then placed a bet on who
could hit Story first. Id. The defendant walked out of the car, and hit Story in the
mouth. Id. The fellow classmate then hit Story so hard that he was knocked to the
ground. Id. The defendant was stunned that they had hurt Story so badly. Id. At
trial he testified that he did not intend to harm Story. Id. Fire Insurance Ex-
change brought a declaratoryjudgment action alleging that it was not obligated to
defend or cover damages under the defendant's parents' liability insurance. Id. at
362.
The Altieri case involved the interpretation of a section of the insurance code,
not an insurance policy. Id. at 363 n.5. The California Insurance Code states:
"[a]n insurer is not liable for loss caused by the willful act of the insured;" some-
what similar words to the intentional injury exclusion clause. CAL. INS. CODE § 533
(West 1993). The court interpreted this clause to imply an intentional injury ex-
clusion clause in every liability policy. Altieri, I Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363 (citing M.K.,
804 P.2d at 689). The California courts interpreted the code section to mean that
when an act is inherently harmful, there is no requirement of intent to harm, only
intent to act, thereby inferring intent to harm. Id. at 364. The court noted that
when harm is inherent in the act, then intent to harm is relevant only to determine
intent to commit the act. Id. In such situations, the emphasis should not be on
the intent to injure, but on the harmful nature of the act. Id. at 364-65.
152. Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct.
App. 1993); see Sean W. Gallagher, Note, The Public Policy Exclusion and Insurance for
Intentional Employment Discrimination, 92 MicH. L. REv. 1256, 1297-1301 (1994) (not-
ing that courts have refused to enforce insurance for sexual harassment); Robert
A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Employment
Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus. LAw. 689, 701 (1994) (stating
that Coit made it clear that sexual harassment could not be covered under general
liability policy).
In Coit, the California Court of Appeals for the First District held that an in-
sured could not shift to the insurance company the cost of defending and the
damages resulting from the insured's sexual harassment of an employee. Coit, 18
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695. The court stated that sexual harassment was intentionally
harmful, regardless of subjective intent. Id. The court reached this conclusion
because of California's Insurance Code which states that the insurer is not liable
for any willful act of the insured. Id. at 698. This part of the insurance code has
been interpreted as an intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. For a detailed de-
scription of § 533 of the California Insurance Code, see supra note 150 and accom-
panying text.
In Coit, Ms. Linda Seahorn sued Coit Drapery Cleaners, Dr. Kearn, and Ms.
Parks for sexual harassment, wrongful termination, breach of public policy, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, fraud, battery and sought
punitive damages. Id. at 696. In 1987, Ms. Seahorn interviewed for a position as a
telephone dispatcher for Coit Drapery Cleaners. Id. at 695. Rather than ask about
her skills relating to the job, Dr. LouisJ. Kearn, the President and Chairman of the
Board of Coit, asked Ms. Seahorn if she would be willing to sleep with prospective
clients, if she would sleep with him on business trips, and if she had a boyfriend.
Id. Ms. Seahorn, concerned about this type of questioning, asked another em-
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employee.1 53 It remains unlikely, however, that Pennsylvania will expand
ployee, Ms. Park, whether this was normal. Id. at 695-96. Ms. Park told Ms.
Seahorn not to worry, that while Dr. Kearn had a reputation as a "dirty old man,"
he was really harmless. Id. at 696. And yet, evidence disclosed at trial revealed that
Dr. Kearn had a reputation of harassing women and forcing them to make them-
selves available to him if they wanted to be promoted or stay employed. Id. at 695.
After Ms. Seahorn accepted employment, Dr. Kearn allegedly propositioned
Ms. Seahorn numerous times. Id. at 696. He asked her what kind of underwear
she wore; he tried to get her to play strip poker with him; he even attempted, with
the assistance of Ms. Park, to get her to join him in a hot-tub. Id. Finally, Dr.
Kearn asked Ms. Seahorn to meet him in his office during business hours. Id. He
asked Ms. Seahorn for a hug, and then a more passionate hug. Id. At this point,
Dr. Kearn forced Ms. Seahorn into the bathroom, put her hand in his pants, and
tried to reach into her underwear. Id. He pulled her to the floor and demanded
sex, but Ms. Seahorn refused and left. Id. Almost immediately, Ms. Seahorn was
fired due to "adverse economic conditions." Id. However, the same economic
conditions existed at the time she was fired as existed at the time she was hired. Id.
As a result of Dr. Kearn's actions, Ms. Seahorn suffered lost wages, psychiatric
problems, depression, chemical dependency and suicidal thoughts. Id.
Coit Drapery attempted to turn the suit over to Sequoia Insurance Company
from whom it had previously purchased a liability policy. Id. Sequoia refused to
defend Coit or pay for resultant damages because the action of sexual harassment
was intended or expected, and thus excluded from coverage under § 533 of the
Insurance Code, which is an implied intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. at
696-98. For a detailed description of the analysis of California's Insurance Code,
see supra note 150 and accompanying text.
The court remarked that "California law and applicable precedents do not
allow the re-characterization of such clearly intentional and willful sexual miscon-
duct as merely negligent or non-willful, so as to trigger insurance coverage." Id. at
697. The court in Coit noted that in M.K., the court had held that sexually mo-
lesting a child was a willful act, and thus barred coverage of the insured under
§ 533 of California's Insurance Code. Id. The court cited several other cases all of
which supported the principle that an insurance company would not be liable for
the willful and intentional actions of the insured as a result of the implied inten-
tional injury exclusion clause. Id. (citing Studley v. Benicia Unified Sch. Dist., 281
Cal. Rptr. 631 (1991); Altier, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360; B & E Convalescent Ctr. v.
State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (1992)). The court then noted
that none of these cases involved sexual harassment, but determined that § 533
would also preclude an insured from recovering from an insurance company in
relation to intentional sexual harassment. Id. at 698. In denying coverage to the
insured, the court analogized sexual harassment to the sexual molestation of a
child and concluded: " ' [s]ection 533 precludes coverage in this case because [the
wrongful act] is always intentional, it is always wrongful, and it is always harmful.'"
Id. at 705 (quoting MK., 804 P.2d at 689).
153. B & E Convalescent Ctr., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894. In B & E Convalescent, the
Court of Appeals for the Second District of California found that an insured who
intentionally and wrongfully terminated an employee was not covered under its
liability policy because intent to injure could be inferred because wrongful termi-
nation is inherently injurious. Id. at 907-10. Ms. Bryson was employed as an ad-
ministrator at the B & E Convalescent Center from 1977 until 1984. Id. at 897.
During her employment, Ms. Bryson refused to fire current employees and replace
them with individuals of Filipino national origin. Id. Ms. Bryson alleged that her
employer wanted to make these changes in employees because he thought that the
Filipino employees would not vote for the union. Id. Ms. Bryson was fired in No-
vember of 1984, and later brought an action for wrongful termination, when she
was replaced by a younger Filipino man. Id. at 897-98. Bryson settled with B & E
Convalescent Center who then attempted to recover from its liability insurer. Id. at
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its version of "inferred intent." Pennsylvania focuses on the inherent
harm of certain actions, but limits the approach to the "exceptional" case
of sexual molestation of children.1 54
Karen M. Houk
899. The trial court held that because the action was intentional, there was no
coverage as a result of the implied intentional injury exclusion clause. Id. at 899-
900.
On appeal, B & E Convalescent Center alleged that § 533 of the Insurance
Code did not apply. Id. at 900. B & E Convalescent Center argued that for the
intentional injury exclusion clause implied in § 533 to apply, the insured must
have intent to harm. Id. The court remarked that the purpose of § 533 was to
prevent coverage of intentional torts, reflecting the public policy argument that an
insured should not be able to recover for actions that he or she intended. Id. at
904. B & E Convalescent Center analogized to the Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978) and Republic Idem. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 331 (Ct. App. 1990) which both held that there must be subjective intent to
harm. Id. at 905-06 (citing Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal.
1978) (holding that under § 533, insured must have "preconceived design to in-
flict injury"); Republic Indem. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 331 (Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that under § 533 insured must have intent to act and intent
to harm)). However, the court in B & E Convalescent remarked that these decisions
had been clarified and undermined by the Supreme Court of California's decision
in M.K. that a preconceived intention to harm is not necessary if the harm is inher-
ent in the act. Id. While the Supreme Court of California had limited its holding
in MK to sexual molestation of children, other courts have since expanded the
idea of inherent harm to actions other than sexual molestation of children. B &E
Convalescent Ctr., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 906 (citing Altieri, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360).
The California Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit then determined that
wrongful termination was an act that was inherently harmful. Id. at 907. The court
remarked that if an individual was terminated against policy set in anti-discrimina-
tion statutes, the termination was inherently harmful. Id. The court also found
that the loss of ajob is both financially and psychologically harmful. Id. Further-
more, when the loss of employment is the result of discrimination for age, sex, race
or nationality, it is even more devastating. Id. Therefore, it would be improper to
come to any conclusion except that an insured is not obligated to cover the inten-
tional act of wrongful termination because it is inherently injurious. Id. at 908.
154. For a complete discussion of Wiley, see supra notes 107-29 and accompa-
nying text.
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